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1 Britain constitutes a peculiar case study in the area of citizenship, as British laws did
not contain the word “citizenship” until the British Nationality Act of 1948. Although
before that the institution1 of “subjecthood” worked in a comparable way, the 1948 Act
was unique, as it made provision for six distinct citizenship statuses (most countries
only have two – national and non-national), a number that further increased with the
Immigration Bill  of 1971. This article does not,  however,  aim to be simply a tale of
British exceptionalism. By contrasting the British case to that of France, it aims to put
forward the hypothesis that it was the successful diffusion of the French model that
made most states in the world opt for the binary citizen/non-citizen or national/non-
national model, effectively rendering the alternative British approach an insular case.
2 In  the  following  pages,  I  will  first  present  two  different  lineages  of  contemporary
citizenship, valid for the British and the French case, respectively. I will argue that it is
heuristically  advantageous  to  study  British  subjecthood  and  French  nationalité  and 
citoyenneté2 as two different institutions. I will then present some possible explanations
for  the  diffusion  of  the  French  model  before  turning  to  the  history  of  British
subjecthood/citizenship, showing how the latter developed in a separate fashion and
how it seems to have recently shifted closer to the French model. I will conclude this
article with an analysis of some aspects of everyday citizenship in Britain and France,
showing the  significant  autonomy of  everyday  conceptions  from the  historical  and
institutional development of formal citizenship, as well as some effects that the formal
dimension nevertheless seems to have on the notions of citizenship amongst ordinary
people.
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Two different lineages of citizenship?
3 Academics  (and  others)  have  two  common  ways  of  describing  the  development  of
contemporary citizenship. Many start from the Magna Carta of 1215 to trace the history
of English freedom and English citizenship, and present the French Revolution of 1789
as a partial transformation of the same freedoms. Others consider the Magna Carta and
the successive similar British developments as privileges dealing with personal status
rather than with general political norms, and point to similar institutions that existed
in  other  countries  across  Europe  –  with  the  significant  exception  that  the  English
institutions were the only ones to survive into the contemporary era.3 In this second
lineage,  the  universalistic  nature  of  the  1789  revolution  is  presented  as  without
precedent. The absolute (illuminated) monarchies, with their removal of all the powers
rival to the central one, anticipated the developments of the Revolution as much as the
experience of British liberalism. Schnapper (58-69) is among the proponents of the first
lineage, while Brubaker (1992) presents many of the aspects of the second – although
the author himself indicates how this lineage can already be found in Marx. 
4 For the scopes of this article, we can consider the two lineages of citizenship (which
might be called “liberal” for the one starting with the Magna Carta, and “statist” for
the one starting with the 1789 revolution) as the origins of two different institutions.
British citizenship (subjecthood) was based on the limits placed on the power of the
state, whereas French citizenship was based on the removal of all powers except those
of the state. In the following pages, I will show how these approaches justify both the
binary citizen/non-citizen French system, as well as the multiplication of statuses in
British legislation.
 
The French model and its diffusion
5 Rogers  Brubaker  (1992)  describes  the  French  Revolution  as  the  origin  of  both
contemporary citizenship and the contemporary idea of “nation”. Other scholars are
more  nuanced  in  their  positions:  Peter  Sahlins  (2003,  2004),  for  example,  shows
evidence of significant citizenship reform in France already in the 1750s, although he
agrees about the “revolutionary” significance of the French experience of citizenship
reform. The 18th century has more generally been identified by both Anderson and
Hobsbawm as the first  period of  emergence and construction of national  identities,
identities that both “popular” and “state” nationalisms then supraimposed to earlier
historical periods.
6 Both Brubaker’s analysis of the history of citizenship in France, and Torpey’s analysis
of  the development of  the passport clearly show how the revolutionary period was
characterized in France by the construction of a uniform juridical and political internal
space, by the abolition of internal barriers to movement, and by the definition of clear
external frontiers, both in terms of territory and population. While initially open to
foreigners who shared the ideals of the revolution, the nationality of Revolutionary
France was rapidly well-delimited, excluding potentially hostile foreigners, as well as
expatriates. 
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7 This clear-cut binary division between nationals and non-nationals is the most common
way in which contemporary states deal with their citizenry. How can we explain this
diffusion of the French model? Napoleonic conquests had a clear role in spreading the
model: citizenship spread to most of Continental Europe together with the Code civil
and  the  metric  system.  Wright  further  argues  that  France  was  hegemonic  in  the
military,  colonial,  diplomatic  and cultural  fields  for  most  of  the  modern and early
contemporary period,  rendering French a  lingua franca.  Here,  I  wish to focus on a
single aspect among those presented by Wright: the role of French as the diplomatic
language of record between the 1714 Treaty of Rastatt and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles
(in which English was added as a second language), and more generally the hegemony
of France and the French language that continued in the field of diplomacy even after
1919. Torpey shows how the emergence of the global passport system coincided with
this period of French hegemony. While the first states to introduce passports took upon
themselves  to  provide  identification  documents  to  the  foreigners  who  entered  the
national territory, the diffusion of the practice meant that each state was subject to
external  pressure  to  define  the  confines  of  its  population  and  to  codify  who  was
entitled to a national passport (in addition to the on-going need to define the national
population in order to facilitate mass conscription). While the internal organization of
France was a politically unacceptable model for many other states during most of this
period, when faced with the need to define the external organization of the state (who
was and who was not a national), imitating France, which hegemonized international
diplomacy, was much more acceptable. 
8 These factors of diffusion of the French model can also explain the British exception.
Other than obviously resisting Napoleon, Britain was always the “other” hegemonic
state: it was powerful enough and its empire was large enough to be free from the need
to imitate France in regulating nationality.  Colley argues that much of the political
identification  the  national  population  established  with  Britain  was  the  result  of
intermittent  wars  with France between the 18th and the 19 th century.  According to
Colley, the fear of foreign invasion was a strong factor in the emerging identification
with  the  nation,  together  with  Protestantism  which,  in  opposition  to  French
Catholicism, was a powerful “cement” for Great Britain (but, obviously, not for Ireland).
9 A more systematic analysis of the diffusion of the French model (and its exceptions)
than the one I can offer in the limited space of this article would probably provide
precious knowledge about membership in the contemporary world. At this point I will
limit the discussion to some hypotheses about Latin America, which are particularly
suggestive because of the role that Benedict Anderson attributes to the area in the
formation of the contemporary idea of ”nation”. The figure of Simón Bolívar is notable
in  this  context  and  not  simply  because  of  traditional  portrayals  that  show him as
inspired by Napoleon’s coronation to promote the values of the French Revolution in
Latin America. Bolívar also tried to consolidate his crumbling power by attempting to
introduce the Code civil (which was later effectively introduced in Chile in 1855, and
from  there  spread  to  most  of  the  continent  –  Mirow), showing  how  the  French
institutions  of  the  time  resonated  with  nascent  (following  Anderson’s  hypothesis)
nations. 
10 One important context in which the binary national/non-national model was much less
applied  was  that  of  the  colonies  –  including  the  French  ones.  No  colonial  power
renounced  the  opportunity  to  stratify  the  legal  statuses  of  the  populations  of  the
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colonies,  thereby  guaranteeing  privileged  conditions  to  European  settlers  and  co-
opting part of the native elites into the administration of the colonies. The history and
the regulations of the statuses of colonial populations are far more complicated than
those of non-colonized states. Nevertheless, once the colonized territories began the
decolonization process, the binary model was again the most frequently chosen, even if
this sometimes meant the disenfranchisement and sometimes the expulsion of part of
the  population.  Indeed,  Manby  (2009)  highlights  how  the  colonial  powers  usually
guided the creation of new legislation concerning citizenship, pressuring for simple
approaches that gave clear citizen or non-citizen status to the entire population of
nascent  states.  Manby  also  adds  that  in  some  African  states  later  legislation
complicated the issue by declaring some ethnic groups native to the national territory




11 Ann  Dummett,  an  authoritative  scholar  of  the  history  of  the  British  legislation  of
citizenship, describes the history of British subjecthood, nationality and citizenship as
“extraordinarily confused” (2006, 554). This is not only because of the effects of the
common law system, but also because of a relative lack of interest on behalf of the
British Crown and Government concerning questions of nationality, which continued
for a very long period. I argue here that a further cause for this kind of development of
citizenship  in  Britain  was  an  institutional  concept  of  nationality  focused  on  the
freedoms from the state rather than on a clear relationship to the state itself. 
12 British nationality has been governed by specific precedents for most of its history:
court judgements, such as Calvin’s Case (1608) defined subjecthood as linked to birth
having taken place on the territory of the kingdom (provided the parents were not
“enemy” aliens or foreign diplomatic personnel) and kept in case of emigration.4 Such a
way of defining subjecthood was not much different from what subjecthood had meant
in France up to the French Revolution: in both cases those effectively concerned with
subjecthood were mostly potential land inheritors, as well as merchants interested in
avoiding limitations imposed on foreigners (see also Sahlins 2003, 2004). It was only
with the 1789 revolution and the creation of an institution based on a clear political
definition of the population of the state that a different kind of citizenship appeared
and  began  spreading  outside  of  France.  British  subjecthood,  on  the  other  hand,
remained less defined and centred on the relationship of the individual to the monarch.
Dummett and Nicol (1990) show how from 1608 to 1948 British subjecthood remained
based on precedent and on sporadic legislative interventions that mostly recognized
the precedents. Being born in the territories of the Crown meant becoming subjects for
a  significant  part  of  the  population.  Obviously,  vast  exceptions  existed  for  several
groups:  non-Protestants,  women  (and  in  particular  married  women),  most  of  the
colonized populations, black victims of slavery being the one population to lack any
juridical personality. The limitation to the subjecthood of non-Protestants was finally
lifted  during  the  19th century,  with  the  abolition  of  religious  oaths  as  part  of  the
naturalization process5; juridical discrimination against women was abolished during
the general shift to citizenship equality of the late 20th century (see Knop 2001). On the
other hand, large parts of the colonial populations were continuously kept confined to
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lesser juridical statuses; indeed, some of the measures taken in the second half of the
20th century can be interpreted as echoing the same discriminations existing in this
period  against  colonial  populations  (see  the  next  paragraph).  Even  for  the  (large)
discriminated  populations,  some  lesser  or  dependent  juridical  status  existed,  all
descending from some form of recognized relationship with the Crown. Banerjee for
example  shows  how  Indians  relied  on  the  1858  proclamation  of  Queen  Victoria,
establishing direct crown sovereignty over India, to claim Imperial subjecthood and,
indeed, citizenship. She also highlights how one of the main uses of this claim was to
challenge the restrictions to settlement in the “white dominions”. At the same time the
Empire had a significant influence on several institutional and social aspects of Britain.
Thompson observes for example how the debate about the extension of voting rights
(including women’s voting rights) and about the autonomy of Ireland were influenced
by the presence of institutional solutions that were often more progressive in other
parts of the Empire – including mostly white dominions, but also Jamaica.
13 Obviously,  the  institution  of  British  subjecthood  cannot  be  explained  through  the
relative power of the Crown. For most of the period concerned, the British monarchs
exerted less power over the British state than most of the monarchs on the Continent
held over their states. Nor can this be explained by proposing that Britain was simply
being backwards in terms of moving toward contemporary citizenship.  While never
completely defined in its external dimensions, the internal nature (the rights) of British
subjecthood became progressively similar to what we refer to as “citizenship” today.
For most of the period in question, British subjects (again, those outside the colonies)
were more similar  in  their  political  roles  to  French citizens than they were to  the
nationals of the other Continental states. Moreover, there were other states in which
the legislation on nationality referred to the relationship of the individual with the
Crown,  even  if  it  was  increasingly  the  relationship  with  the  metropolitan  state
(colonies  always  being  a  more  complex  context)  that  featured  at  the  centre  of
nationality and citizenship (see for example Donati, in particular 69-94).
14 Dummett  and  Nicol  (1990,  82)  underline  how,  after  the  late  18th century,  British
citizenship was set apart from most other cases by its lack of systematicity, but not
necessarily  by  its  lack  of  justice.  Again,  British  citizenship  was  a  different  kind  of
institution,  rather  than  simply  being  backwards.  The  authors  argue  that  juridical
factors,  such  as  the  rule  of  precedent,  and  the  lack  of  a  written  Constitution  (in
addition to the lack of a popular revolution that could introduce a written Constitution)
were  behind  these  developments.  I  wish  to  add  that  the  different  nature  of  the
citizenship institutions in Britain also played a role. In a context that saw citizenship
primarily defined by the existence of political spaces relatively free from the state, the
codifying of formal belonging to the state was far less urgent than in contexts where
citizenship and politics were mostly exercised through the state. “Institutions” is the
key word here: while ideas did have a role, British legislators, for whom citizenship in
any case  was  hardly  a  major  interest,  were probably  more interested in  producing
norms coherent with existing institutions, rather than norms coherent with general
political philosophies. I should also underline here that I consider these institutional
differences  to  be  autonomous  from  what  has  been  described  in  the  area  of  later
minority  policies,  as  the  difference  between  a  “multicultural”  Britain  and  an
“universalistic  republican”  France.  Not  only  have  these  differences  often  been
exaggerated, if one looks at the actual policies in the two countries,6 but countries far
more “multicultural” than Britain (especially outside Western Europe) have and have
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had citizenship laws that are much more binary than the British ones. While it might
appear that articulated definitions of belonging and multiculturalism go hand in hand,
the  particularity  of  British  citizenship  that  I  explore  in  this  article  is  much  more
circumscribed and path-dependent, as I will show in the following paragraphs.
 
Codifying and convergence
15 The British Nationality Act of 1948 was the first to systematically deal with the juridical
status of the population of the British Empire. As anticipated at the beginning of this
article, the 1948 law is notable for defining six separate statuses: citizen of the UK and
colonies (CUKC), citizen of independent Commonwealth country (CICC), British subject
in Ireland, British subject without citizenship (BSWC), British protected person (BPP)
and  alien.  The  Act  brought  together  lesser  statuses  used  for  colonial  populations
(BSWC, BPP) with statuses created as a response to the independence gained by parts of
the Empire (Ireland and to a  different degree,  Canada).  A survey of  the citizenship
legislation of European countries made in the important EUDO Citizenship database
(www.eudo-citizenship.eu) does not show laws as complex as the British 1948 Act,7 nor
are there comparably complex laws among those presented in the analysis of laws of
African states of Manby (2010), except for the extreme and hardly comparable case of
apartheid South Africa after 1970 (see Klaaren).
16 Randall Hansen clearly shows how the motivation for introducing the 1948 Act was the
creation of a specific Canadian citizenship in 1946 (see also Paul 14-18). With one of the
British dominions introducing a specific citizenship, the British Government tried to
reconcile this innovation with the conservation of a juridically united Empire (which
thus  continued to  influence  the  institutions  of  the  metropole  –  cf  Thompson).  The
United Kingdom was the only Empire to have had white majority dominions such as
Canada, Australia and New Zealand; as such, the law can partially be explained by the
complex structure of the British Empire and by a greater political will to keep links
with at least part of its colonial subjects. Karatani, for example, claims that the whole
“fuzziness” of British citizenship derives from a historically constant will  to extend
some  kind  of  membership  beyond  Britain  (or  earlier,  England)  proper.  Still,  other
explanations are to be found outside strictly colonial factors. No other major colonial
power managed the end of its Empire as did Britain: France and Portugal both shed the
populations of their colonies from allegiance once the colonial wars were lost, leaving
preferential  naturalization  procedures  in  place  for  the  colonial  elites  (white  or
otherwise)  who  wished  to  become  full  citizens  of  the  metropolitan  state.  The
Netherlands had given Dutch nationality to the population of  its  smaller Caribbean
colonies, while limiting conferring the lesser status on the majority of the much larger
population Indonesia. Despite this differentiation, most of the colonial population was
pushed  to  renounce  Dutch  nationality  on  independence  (see  Van  Oers  et  al.).  As
suggested up until now in this article, introducing such a complex law as the BNA of
1948 was more feasible in the United Kingdom than elsewhere, because of the nature of
UK institutions.  These phenomena are better explained by path dependency and/or
institutional inertia than by the strength of ideas; in fact, the relationship of the British
governments to the populations of its former colonies during decolonization has been
described by several commentators as strongly ambiguous (see, among others, Freeman
& Spencer; Solomos et al.; Miles & Phizacklea; Paul).
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17 Hansen (op. cit.) observes how the 1948 Act seems out of place considering how the
right of entry of colonial subjects began to be limited a few years after the Act, but he
explains how this immigration channel became a central issue only in the 1950s. The
1962 and 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Acts signalled the closing of opportunities
for entering Britain that had theoretically been available up to that point. Before the
1960s, there were limitations on free movement between different parts of the Empire,
in particular on movement to the white majority dominions (see also Banerjee), while
Britain itself was theoretically open to all subjects of the Crown. The Commonwealth
Immigration Acts  limited  this  freedom and did  so  in  ways  reminiscent  of  previous
measures enacted in the white Dominions. The Commonwealth Immigration Acts have
been described as implicitly racial in public discourse since the late 1960s, as the full
right of entry was restricted to the descendants of people born in the United Kingdom,
while  limiting  the  right  of  entry  for other  colonial  subjects.  This  implicitly  meant
leaving  space  for  the  “return”  of  white  colonials,  while  limiting  non-white
immigration.  The  1971  Immigration  Act  made  the  approach  more  explicit  by  the
introduction of  the  “patrial”  category,  in  reference  to  individuals  descending  from
people born on UK territory. The Act also made British nationality even more complex
and  stratified,  as  the  six  categories  of  1948  were  transformed  into  what  can  be
considered ten separate statuses, with CUKCs, CICCs, BSWCs and Irish citizens being
divided between patrials and non-patrials.
18 1981 saw further restrictions being imparted on the right to entry of several categories,
but also what can be considered the start of a convergence to the model “of French
origin”. The 1981 British Nationality Act further limited the rights attached to certain
statuses and made some of the statuses (British Overseas Citizens – who before were
non-patrial CICCs, British subjects–former non-patrial BSWCs, and BPPs) non-passable
to one’s offspring. While the main intention and meaning of the act was again to limit
the possibilities for colonial subjects to enter the metropolitan territory, making part
of  the  statuses  destined  to  extinction  meant  a  potential  simplification  of  British
nationality.
19 While  British  nationality  still  has  not  reached  the  citizen/non-citizen  binary
simplification, in a number of aspects it has become more similar to other European
citizenship  laws.  Karatani  underlines  how  the  entire  1962  to  1981  period  can  be
considered as having been characterized by the “nationalization” of British citizenship.
This convergence with the binary model often happened by way of imitating the more
restrictive measures of other European states, as with the 2002 and 2009 reforms that
saw naturalization tests take a restrictive direction (see, among others, Kostakopoulou)
that echoed the spread of naturalization tests across Europe since the late 1990s. More
generally, some statuses have been hollowed out of content by the restriction of access
to metropolitan territory, with some statuses having been made almost vestigial. There
are still measures in Britain that are not so common in other states, such as the right of
Commonwealth and Irish citizens to vote in national elections without having to obtain
British citizenship. Nonetheless, British laws today are not as dissimilar from those of
the rest of  the world as they were some decades ago,  even if  this change occurred
mostly by way of the introduction of restrictive measures.
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“Everyday citizenship” implications
20 The arguments presented up to now have dealt with institutional tendencies that are
retraceable through historical periods and at a high level of abstraction. Considering
how Brubaker’s work on citizenship in France and Germany (1992) has often been taken
as indicating different orientations of French and German societies as a whole,8 it is
important  to  highlight  here that  legislation on,  and everyday social  conceptions of
citizenship, have no strong deterministic link.
21 “Everyday  citizenship”  is  an  approach  that  uses  qualitative  methods  to  study  the
conceptions  that  common people  have  of  citizenship  (see  Miller-Idriss  2006;  Fox  &
Miller-Idriss). Other than being obviously variable from one person to the next, these
conceptions are also fairly autonomous from those expressed in the laws of a given
state.  For example,  while Germany and Italy are considered to have restrictive and
“ethnic” citizenship laws, Miller-Idriss’s research with young people in Berlin (2006), as
well as my own research with Italian factory workers in the Ferrara area (Sredanovic),
show the predominance of, respectively, inclusive cultural conceptions, and inclusive
economic conceptions of citizenship. Moreover, everyday conceptions seem to be less
inertial and path-dependant than legislation: in the same Berlin research, Miller-Idriss
(2009)  shows  significant  changes  in  terms  of  ideas  of  nationality  between  the
generation of teachers she interviewed and the generation of their students.
22 If  the  main  result  is  the  relative  autonomy  of  laws  and  everyday  visions,  there  is
nevertheless a traceable result of the French-British divergences presented up until
now. The Leicester research of Lister, Smith and colleagues (Lister et al.; Smith et al.) on
the perceptions of citizenship by young people found a rather vague idea of citizenship,
some  of  the  interviewees  having  being  unable  to  define  it,  or  stating  simply  that
“everybody is a citizen” (Lister et al. 237). On the other hand, a number of studies with
young  people  in  France  (Venel;  Ribert;  Rio)  and  again,  Miller-Idriss’  research  with
young  people  in  Germany  (2009),  found  ideas  of  citizenship  that,  without  being
completely free of misconceptions, nevertheless showed much greater clarity than the
Leicester  one.  It  could therefore  be  hypothesized that  the shorter  and less  defined
history of citizenship in Britain has led to a less diffuse social sedimentation of the
concept.  The different  ideas  about  what  makes someone a  citizen according to  the
Leicester interviewees – for example the fact of being “respectable”, i.e.,  the idea of
being employed and having a family – were also found among the interviewees of other
research, the differences between the different studies being the level of clarity that
the concept of citizenship in general assumes.
23 Obviously,  the  historical  development  of  the  concept  is  not  the  only  possible
determinant  for  its  clarity  among ordinary people.  For  example,  among the Italian
factory  workers  I  interviewed  (Sredanovic),  many  did  not  distinguish  between
citizenship as such and more limited statuses such as a permit of stay. Other factors,
such  as  the  salience  of  citizenship  legislation  within  public  political  debate,  or
citizenship  education,  can  be  as  influential  as  the  historical  development  of  the
legislation.9 In this sense, the rising importance given to citizenship in education and in
other British policies since the 1998 Crick Report (see Kiwan) is probably having an
impact on the social salience of citizenship in Britain, which might become more visible
in the next few years. Still, these policies remain characterized by an approach that
puts  forward  social  cohesion  and  neoliberal  norms  of  citizen  responsibility.  These
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approaches  to  citizenship,  citizenship  education  and  citizenship  policy  are  not
uncommon in other countries, nor have they been absent in the past outside Britain.
Nonetheless,  rights  and  political  participation  in  Britain  have  comparatively  less
institutional expression where they have been explicitly linked to citizenship. I do not
wish to exaggerate the implications of these developments here; British society has not
been less concerned with rights and participation than other societies and the most
famous academic codification of citizenship-as-rights (Marshall) remains British. Still,




24 In  this  paper,  I  have  shown  how  citizenship  in  Britain in  its  external  and  formal
dimensions has been set apart from most other states due to lesser systematicity, late
codification and higher complexity. These original characteristics are linked to a large
number  of  causes,  including  the  general  juridical  (common  law)  system,  political
history (lack of  popular  revolutions),  the different  nature of  British political  rights
(based  on  limitations  imparted  on  state  powers),  colonial  history,  institutional
equilibrium and path dependency.
25 It was also my intention to emphasize that, despite the multiplicity of factors involved,
the impact of the nature of citizenship in Britain should not be exaggerated, as the
differences  in  everyday perceptions  between Britain and other  contexts  are  mostly
limited to the salience, rather than on the content, of citizenship. More generally, the
effects  which  seem  to  depend  more  on  “institutional”  (i.e.,  historical  forms  of
citizenship) than on “material” (e.g., the colonial situation) factors, are probably best
explained in terms of path dependency and institutional inertia. To attribute it entirely
to  concepts  such as  universalism or  liberalism would likely  mean exaggerating the
strength of ideas.
26 Studies,  such as the present one,  that compare general  institutions across different
countries and ample periods of time should always be conducted with caution. First,
they need ample comparable data. In the case of citizenship legislation, this data exists
especially for Europe (although the EUDO Citizenship project has started including data
beyond  Europe).  Data  covering  other  countries  and  offering  more  detail  on  the
historical evolution of legislation, would allow a better understanding of the themes
discussed here. Moreover, studies based on time periods that are large in scope, as well
as on general themes, often tend to generalize their findings and to attribute them
great  explanatory  and  causal  force,  only  to  often  be  contradicted  by  studies  more
limited in themes, time and space.
27 Nevertheless, it is my hope that in this paper, I have shown the existence of limited
phenomena,  such as  the  British  approach to  citizenship  at  the  end of  the  colonial
Empire and the lesser social salience of the concept of citizenship among young people
in Britain as aspects that can or need be explained (also) by institutional factors.
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NOTES
1. Citizenship and subjecthood are here considered as institutions – as patterns of norms that
exist in relatively comparable forms across time and legal systems. This allows both to discuss
the two without limiting oneself to the individual laws as they were promulgated, and to treat
the French and British models of citizenship as heuristically different institutions.
2. Historically the distinction in France between nationalité and citoyenneté has been among the
clearest distinctions between the juridical status that links an individual and a state (the external
dimension of  citizenship,  nationalité)  and the rights,  especially  political  rights,  linked to  this
status  (the  internal  dimension  of  citizenship,  citoyenneté).  However,  the  two  institutions  are
never easy to completely distinguish, and there is no vocabulary that clearly identifies the two
dimensions across countries and time. In this article, the focus is on the external dimension of
citizenship – that for which Britain is set apart – but I will nonetheless use both concepts of
citizenship and nationality, reserving the second term for notions of citizenship less linked to
(political) rights. 
3. Holt is a good synthesis of both the positions that see the Magna Carta as the closest thing to a
Constitution that  exists  in  the United Kingdom, and the positions that  see it  as  establishing
merely feudal privileges similar to those existing elsewhere in Europe at the time. 
4. Dummett & Nicol 1990, 59-63. I will not expand on the details of the different laws in this
article,  as  excellent  histories  of  the  British citizenship legislation exist  already –  other  than
Dummett & Nicol, see Dummett 2006 and Sawyer & Wray 2012. I will rather focus on the aspects
that set Britain apart from the most common ways in which the other states have regulated
citizenship.
5. Colley  links  this  development,  and  the  extension  of  suffrage  in  1832,  to  the  military
mobilization of a large part of the male population during the war against Revolutionary and
Napoleonic France,  and the consequent need to recognize a larger part  of  the population as
citizens.
6. But see the more articulated analysis of Favell.
7. Several states, such as Germany, Greece, or Hungary, do have something similar to a specific
juridical  status  for  “co-ethnic”  non-nationals,  but  these  are  arguably  used  to  facilitate
naturalization  or  assure  specific  rights,  rather  than  intended  to  be  permanent  membership
statuses.
8. This has been criticized by the author himself: see Brubaker 1999.
9. The  knowledge  of  citizenship  of  the  students  interviewed  in  Miller-Idriss  2009  is  not  so
surprising considering that during the research of the author they were receiving classes on
citizenship and citizenship laws.
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ABSTRACTS
In this article I offer an analysis of the history of citizenship in the UK by showing the low level of
systematicity and the high complexity of this institution. By comparing it with the binary French
case, I consider the two models of citizenship as two institutions with different goals, arguing
that  the diffusion of  the French model  has  turned British citizenship into  an insular  case.  I
further show that  the consequences of  the different histories  of  citizenship can be found in
everyday conceptions of citizenship in the UK and elsewhere, but that these consequences are
limited to the salience and not to the content of the concept. 
Dans cet article je propose une analyse de l’histoire de la citoyenneté au Royaume-Uni. En le
comparant au cas français,  de nature binaire,  je  propose une approche des deux modèles de
citoyenneté en tant qu’institutions ayant différentes finalités, en soutenant que la diffusion du
modèle français a rendu insulaire le modèle britannique de citoyenneté. Je montre également
que l'on trouve les conséquences de ces histoires différentes dans les conceptions quotidiennes
de  la  citoyenneté  au  Royaume-Uni  et  ailleurs,  mais  que  ces  conséquences  sont  limitées  à
l'importance relative du concept, et non à son sens-même. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: citoyenneté, nationalité, législation, Royaume-Uni, France
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